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AN 


Ethnologists  View  of  History. 


AN  ADDRESS 


BEFORE    THE 


Annual  Meeting  of  the  New  Jersey  Historical  Society, 

AT 

Trenton,  New  Jersey,  January  28,  1896. 


DANIEL  G.  BRINTON,  A.M.,  M.D.,  LL.  D.,  D.  Sc. 

Professor  of  American  Archaeology  in  the  University  of 

Pennsylvania    and    of   General  Ethnology  at  the 

Academy  of  Natural  Sciences  of  Philadelphia. 


PHILADELPHIA,  PA. 

1896. 


/y^THROPOLOOY 


ANTHROP 
UBfWRy 


An  Ethnologist's  View  of  History. 


Mr.  Pri:sident  : 

The  intelligent  thought  of  the  world  is  ever  advancing 
to  a  fuller  appreciation  of  the  worth  of  the  past  to  the 
present  and  the  future.  Never  before  have  associations, 
societies  and  journals  devoted  to  historical  studies  been  so 
numerous.  All  times  and  tribes  are  searched  for  memo- 
rials ;  the  remote  corners  of  modern,  medieval  and  an- 
cient periods  are  brought  under  scrutiny  ;  and  going  beyond 
these  again,  the  semi-historic  eras  of  tradition  and  the 
nebulous  gleams  from  pre-historic  milleniums  are  diligently 
scanned,  that  their  uncertain  story  may  be  prefaced  to  that 
registered  in  "the  syllables  of  recorded  time." 

In  this  manner  a  vast  mass  of  material  is  accumulating 
with  which  the  historian  has  to  deal.  What  now  is  the 
real  nature  of  the  task  he  sets  before  himself?  What  is 
the  mission  with  which  he  is  entrusted  ? 

To  understand  this  task,  to  appreciate  that  mission,  he 
must  ask  himself  the  broad  questions  :  What  is  the  aim  of 
history?  What  are  the  purposes  for  which  it  should  be 
studied  and  written? 

He  will  tlnd  no  lack  of  answers  to  these  inquiries,  all 
offered  with  equal  confidence,  but  singularly  discrepant 
among  themselves.      His   embarrassment  will   be   that  of 


•■'^^^r:^' 


17 


selection  between  widely  divergent  views,  each  ably  sup- 
ported by  distinguished  advocates. 

As  I  am  going  to  add  still  another,  not  exactly  like  any 
already  on  the  list,  it  may  well  be  asked  of  me  to  show 
why  one  or  other  of  those  already  current  is  not  as  good 
or  better  than  my  own.  This  requires  me  to  pass  in  brief 
review  the  theories  of  historic  methods,  or,  as  it  is  properly 
termed,  of  the  Philosophy  of  Histor}',  which  are  most  pop- 
ular to-day. 

They  may  be  classified  under  three  leading  opinions,  as 
follows  : 

I.  History  should  be  an  accurate  record  of  events,  and 
nothing  more  ;  an  exact  and  disinterested  statement  of  what 
has  taken  place,  concealing  nothing  and  coloring  nothing, 
reciting  incidents  in  their  natural  connections,  without  bias, 
prejudice,  or  didactic  application  of  any  kind. 

This  is  certainly  a  high  ideal  and  an  excellent  model. 
For  many,  yes,  for  the  majority  of  historical  works,  none 
better  can  be  suggested.  I  place  it  first  and  name  it  as 
worthiest  of  all  current  theories  of  historical  composition. 
But,  I  would  submit  to  you,  is  a  literary  production  answer- 
ing to  this  precept,  really  History?  Is  it  anything  more 
than  a  well-prepared  annal  or  chronicle?  Is  it,  in  fact 
anything  else  than  a  compilation  containing  the  materials 
of  which  real  history  should  be  composed? 

I  consider  that  the  mission  of  the  historian,  taken  in  its 
completest  sense,  is  something  much  more,  much  higher, 
than  the  collection  and  narration  of  events,  no  matter  how 
well  this  is  done.  The  historian  should  be  like  the  man 
of  science,  and  group  iiis  facts  under  inductive  systems  so 
as  to  reach  the  general  laws  which  connect  and  explain 
them.  He  should,  still  further,  be  like  the  artist,  and  en- 
deavor so  to  exhibit  these  connections  under  literary  forms 
that  they  present  to  the  reader  the  impression  of  a  sym- 
metrical and  organic  unity,  in  which  each  part  or  event 


bears  definite  relations  to  all  others.  Collection  and  colla- 
tion are  not  enough.  The  historian  must  "  work  up  his 
field  notes,"  as  the  geologists  say,  so  as  to  extract  from  his 
data  all  the  useful  results  which  they  are  capable  of  yield- 
intj. 

I  am  quite  certain  that  in  these  objections  I  can  count  on 
the  suffrages  of  most.  For  the  majority  of  authors  write 
history  in  a  style  widely  different  from  that  which  I  have 
been  describing.  They  are  distinctly  teachers,  though 
not  at  all  in  accord  as  to  what  they  teach.  They  are  gen- 
erally advocates,  and  with  more  or  less  openness  maintain 
what  I  call  the  second  theory  of  the  aim  of  history,  to  wit : 

2.  History  should  be  a  collection  of  evidence  in  favor  of 
certain  opinions. 

In  this  category  are  to  be  included  all  religious  and  poli- 
tical histories.  Their  pages  are  intended  to  show  the  deal- 
ings of  God  with  man ;  or  the  evidences  of  Christianity,  or 
of  one  of  its  sects,  Catholicism  or  Protestantism ;  or  the 
sure  growth  of  republican  or  of  monarchial  institutions  ;  or 
the  proof  of  a  divine  government  of  the  world ;  or  the 
counter-proof  that  there  is  no  such  government ;  and  the 
like. 

You  will  find  that  most  general  histories  ma}'^  be  placed 
in  this  class.  Probably  a  man  cannot  himself  have  ver}^ 
strong  convictions  about  politics  or  religion,  and  not  let 
them  be  seen  in  his  narrative  of  events  where  such  ques- 
tions are  prominently  present.  A  few  familiar  instances 
will  illustrate  this.  No  one  can  take  either  Lingard's  or 
Macauley's  History  of  England  as  anything  more  than  a 
plea  for  either  writer's  personal  views.  Gibbon's  anti- 
Christian  feeling  is  as  perceptibly  disabling  to  him  in  many 
passages  as  in  the  church  historians  is  their  search  for 
*'  acts  of  Providence,"  and  the  hand  of  God  in  human  af- 
fairs. 

All  such  histories  suffer  from  fatal  flaws.     They  are  de- 


ductive  instead  of  inductive  ;  they  are  a  defensio  sentcnti- 
arum  instead  of  an  invcstigatio  veri;  they  assume  the  final 
truth  as  known,  and  go  not  forth  to  seek  it.  They  are 
therefore  "  teleologic,"  that  is,  they  study  the  record  of 
man  as  the  demonstration  of  a  problem  the  solution  of 
which  is  already  known.  In  this  they  are  essentially 
"  divinatory,"  claiming  foreknowledge  of  the  future  ;  and, 
as  every  ethnologist  knows,  divination  belongs  to  a  stad- 
ium of  incomplete  intellectual  culture,  one  considerably 
short  of  the  highest.  As  has  been  well  said  by  Wilhelm 
von  Humboldt,  any  teleologic  theory  "disturbs  and  falsi- 
fies the  facts  of  histor}^ ;  "^  and  it  has  been  acutely  pointed 
out  by  the  philosopher  Hegel,  that  it  contradicts  the  notion 
of  progress  and  is  no  advance  over  the  ancient  tenet  of  a 
recurrent  cycle. ^ 

I  need  not  dilate  upon  these  errors.  They  must  be  pat- 
ent to  you.  No  matter  how  noble  the  conviction,  how 
pure  the  purpose,  there  is  something  nobler  and  purer  than 
it,  and  that  is,  unswerving  devotion  to  rendering  in  history 
the  truth,  the  whole  truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth. 

I  now  turn  to  another  opinion,  that  which  teaches  that — 

3.  History  should  be  a  portraiture,  more  or  less  ex- 
tended, of  the  evolution  of  the  human  species. 

This  is  claimed  to  be  the  "scientific"  view  of  history. 
It  was  tersely  expressed  by  Alexander  von  Humboldt  in 
<^he  phrase:  "The  history  of  the  world  is  the  mere  ex- 
pression of  a  predetermined,  that  is,  fixed,  evolution."^ 

It   is  that  advocated  by  Auguste   Comte,  Draper  and 

'In  his  epochal  essay  "DieAufgabe  des  Geschichtschreibers."  Ges- 
ammelic  Wcrkc,  Bd.  I.,  s.  13.  It  was  republished  with  a  discriminating 
introduction  by  Professor  Steinthal  in  Die  Sprachphilosophischen  Wcrkc 
Wilhelm  von  Iluviboldfs  (Berlin,  1883). 

*"Der  Zweck-Begriff  bewirkt  nur  sich  selbst,  und  ist  am  Ende  was  er 
im  Anfange,  in  der  UnspriJnglichkeit,  war."  Encyclopddie  dcr  philoso- 
phischcn   Wissetisc/iaf/cn.     Theil,  I.,  §  204. 

3  "  Die  Weltgeschichte  ist  der  blosse  Ausdruck  einer  vorbestimmten 
Entwicklung."     (Qiioted  bj  Lord  Acton.) 


Spencer,  and  a  few  years  ago  Prof.  Gerland,  of  Strasburg, 
formulated  its  basic  maxim  in  these  words:  "Man  has 
developed  from  the  brute  through  the  action  of  purely  me- 
chanical, therefore  fixed,  laws."^ 

The  scientist  of  to-day  who  hesitates  to  subscribe  to 
these  maxims  is  liable  to  be  regarded  as  of  doubtful  learn- 
ing or  of  debilitated  intellect.  I  acknowledge  that  I  am 
one  such,  and  believe  that  I  can  show  sound  reasons  for 
denying  the  assumption  on  which  this  view  is  based. 

It  appears  to  me  just  as  teleologic  and  divinatory  as  those 
I  have  previously  named.  It  assumes  Evolution  as  a  law 
of  the  universe,  whereas  in  natural  science  it  is  only  a 
limited  generalization,  inapplicable  to  most  series  of  natu- 
ral events,  and  therefore  of  uncertain  continuance  in  any 
series.  The  optimism  which  it  inculcates  is  insecure  and 
belongs  to  deductive,  not  inductive,  reasoning.  The  me- 
chanical theory  on  which  it  is  based  lacks  proof,  and  is,  I 
maintain,  insufficient  to  explain  motive,  and,  therefore,  his- 
toric occurrences.  The  assumption  that  history  is  the 
record  of  a  necessary  and  uninterrupted  evolution,  progres- 
sing under  ironclad  mechanical  laws,  is  a  preconceived 
theory  as  detrimental  to  clear  vision  as  are  the  preoccupa- 
tions of  the  theologian  or  the  political  partisan. 

Any  definition  of  evolution  which  carries  with  it  the 
justification  of  optimism  is  as  erroneous  in  history,  as  it 
would  be  in  biology  to  assert  that  all  variations  are  bene- 
ficial. There  is  no  more  certainty  that  the  human  species 
will  improve  under  the  operation  of  physical  laws  than 
that  any  individual  will ;  there  is  far  more  evidence  that 
it  will  not,  as  every  species  of  the  older  geologic  ages  has 
succumbed  to  those  laws,  usually  without  leaving  a  repre- 
sentative. 

I  am  aware  that  I  am  here  in  opposition  to  the  popular 

1  "Die  Menschheit  hat  sich  aus  natiirlicher,  tierischer  Grundlage  auf 
rein  natUrliche  mechanische  Weise  entwickelt."  Anthrofolgische  Bei- 
trdge,  s.  21. 


8 

as  well  as  the  scientific  view.  No  commonplace  is  better 
received  than  that,  "Eternal  progress  is  the  law  of  na- 
ture ;"  though  by  what  process  eternal  laws  are  discovered 
is  imperfectly  explained. 

Applied  to  history,  a  favorite  dream  of  some  of  the  most 
recent  teachers  is  that  the  life  of  the  species  runs  the  same 
course  as  that  of  one  of  its  members.  Lord  Acton,  of  Ox- 
ford, in  a  late  lecture  states  that:  "The  development  of 
society  is  like  that  of  individual ;"  ^  and  Prof.  Fellows,  of 
the  University  of  Chicago,  advances  the  same  opinion  in 
the  words,  "  Humanity  as  a  whole  developes  like  a 
child."" 

The  error  of  this  view  was  clearly  pointed  out  some  years 
ago  by  Dr.  Tobler.^  There  has  been  no  growth  of  hu- 
manity at  large  at  all  comparable  to  that  of  the  individual. 
There  are  tribes  to-day  in  the  full  stone  age,  and  others 
in  all  stages  of  culture  above  it.  The  horizons  of  progress 
have  been  as  local  as  those  of  geography.  No  solidarity 
of  advancement  exists  in  the  species  as  a  whole.  Epochs 
and  stadia  of  culture  vary  with  race  and  climate.  The 
much  talked  of  "law  of  continuity"  does  not  hold  good 
either  in  national  or  intellectual  growth. 

Such  are  the  criticisms  which  may  be  urged  against  the 
historical  methods  now  in  vogue.  What,  you  will  ask,  is 
offered  in  their  stead?  That  which  I  offer  is  the  view  of 
the  ethnologist.  It  is  not  so  ambitious  as  some  I  have 
named.  It  does  not  deal  in  eternal  laws,  nor  divine  the 
distant  future.  The  ethnologist  does  not  profess  to  have 
been  admitted  into  the  counsels  of  the  Almighty,  nor  to 
have  caught  in  his  grasp  the  secret  purposes  of  the  Uni- 
verse.    He  seeks  the  sufhcient  reason  for  known  facts,  and 

^A  Lecture  on  the  Study  of  Hiatoiy,  p.  i  (London,  1895). 

'^See  his  article  "The  Relation  of  Anthropology  to  the  Study  of  His- 
tory,"  in  The  American  Journal  of  Socto/o<,'y,  July,  1S95. 

^Ludwig  Tobler,  in  his  article  "  Zur  Philosophie  der  Geschichte,"  in 
the   Zcitschrift  fiir  Volkerpsychologie^  Bd.   XII.,   s.  195. 


is  content  with  applying  the  knowledge  he  gains  to  present 
action. 

Before  stating  the  view  of  the  ethnologist,  I  must  briefly 
describe  what  the  science  of  Ethnology  is.  You  will  see 
at  once  how  closely  it  is  allied  to  history,  and  that  the  ex- 
planation of  the  one  almost  carries  with  it  the  prescription 
for  the  other. 

It  begins  with  the  acknowledged  maxim  that  man  is  by 
nature  a  gregarious  animal,  a  zoon  -poUtikon^  as  Aristotle 
called  him,  living  in  society,  and  owing  to  society  all  those 
traits  which  it  is  the  business  of  history,  as  distinguished 
from  biology,  to  study. 

From  this  standpoint,  all  that  the  man  is  he  owes  to  others  ; 
and  what  the  others  are,  they  owe,  in  part,  to  him.  To- 
gether, they  make  up  the  social  unit,  at  first  the  family  or 
clan,  itself  becoming  part  of  a  larger  unit,  a  tribe,  nation  or 
people.  The  typical  folk,  or  cthnos,  is  a  social  unit,  the 
members  of  which  are  bound  together  by  certain  traits  com- 
mon to  all  or  most,  which  impart  to  them  a  prevailing  char- 
acter, an  organic  unity,  specific  peculiarities  and  general 
tendencies. 

You  may  inquire  what  these  traits  are  to  which  I  refer 
as  making  up  ethnic  character.  The  answer  cannot  be  so 
precise  as  you  would  like.  We  are  dealing  with  a  natural 
phenomenon,  and  Nature,  as  Goethe  once  remarked,  never 
makes  groups,  but  only  individuals.  The  group  is  a  subjec- 
tive category  of  our  own  minds.  It  is,  nevertheless,  psy- 
chologically real,  and  capable  of  definition. 

The  Ethnos  must  be  defined,  like  a  species  of  natural 
history,  by  a  rehearsal  of  a  series  of  its  characteristics,  not 
by  one  alone.  The  members  of  this  series  are  numerous, 
and  by  no  means  of  equal  importance  ;  I  shall  mention  the 
most  prominent  of  them,  and  in  the  order  in  which  I  be- 
lieve they  should  be  ranked  for  influence  on  national 
character. 


lO 


First,  I  should  rank  Language.  Not  only  is  it  the  me- 
dium of  intelligible  intercourse,  of  thought-tranference,  but 
thought  itself  is  powerfully  aided  or  impeded  by  the  modes 
of  its  expression  in  sound.  As  "spoken  language,"  in 
poetry  and  oratory,  its  might  is  recognized  on  all  hands  ; 
while  in  "  written  language,"  as  literature,  it  works  silently 
but  with  incalculable  effect  on  the  character  of  a  people.^ 

Next  to  this  I  should  place  Government,  understanding 
this  word  in  its  widest  sense,  as  embracing  the  terms  on 
which  man  agrees  to  live  with  his  fellow  man  and  with 
woman,  family,  therefore,  as  well  as  society  ties.  This 
includes  the  legal  standards  of  duty,  the  rules  of  relation- 
ship and  descent,  the  rights  of  property  and  the  customs 
of  commerce,  the  institutions  of  castes,  classes  and  rulers, 
and  those  international  relations  on  which  depend  war  and 
peace.  I  need  not  enlarge  on  the  profound  impress  which 
these  exert  on  the  traits  of  the  people. - 

After  these  I  should  name  Religion,  though  some  bril- 
liant scholars,  such  as  Schelling  and  Max  Miiller,^  have 
claimed  for  it  the  first  place  as  a  formative  influence  on 
ethnic  character.  No  one  will  deny  the  prominent  rank  it 
holds  in  the  earlier  stages  of  human  culture.  It  is  scarcely 
too  much  to  say  that  most  of  the  waking  hours  of  the 
males  of  some  tribes  are  taken  up  with  religious  ceremo- 

'  One  of  the  most  lucid  of  modern  German  philosophical  writers  sajs, 
"Without  language,  there  could  be  no  unity  of  mental  life,  no  national 
life  at  all."  Friedrich  Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  193. 
(English  translation,  New  York,  1895.)  I  need  scarcely  recall  to  the 
student  that  this  was  the  cardinal  principle  of  the  ethnological  writings 
of  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt,  and  that  his  most  celebi-ated  essay  is  entitled 
"  Ueber  die  Verschiedenheit  des  menschlichen  Sprachbaues  und  ihren 
Einfluss  auf  die  geistige  Entwickelung  des  Menschengeschlechts."  The 
thought  is  well  and  tersely  put  by  Prof.  Frank  Granger — "Language  is 
the  instinctive  expression  of  national  spirit."  (  The  Worship  of  the  Ro- 
mans^ p.  19,  London,  1S96.) 

^"Law,  in  its  positive  forms,  may  be  viewed  as  an  instrument  used  to 
produce  a  certain  kind   of  character."     Frank  Granger,  ubi  supra,  p.  19. 

-'  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Religion,  p.  55. 


II 


nies.  Religion  is,  however,  essentially  "  divinatory,"  that 
is,  its  chief  end  and  aim  is  toward  the  future,  not  the  pres- 
ent, and  therefore  the  impress  it  leaves  on  national  charac- 
ter is  far  less  permanent,  much  more  ephemeral,  than  either 
government  or  language.  This  is  constantly  seen  in  daily 
life.  Persons  change  their  religion  with  facility,  but  ad- 
here resolutely  to  the  laws  which  protect  their  property. 
The  mighty  empire  of  Rome  secured  ethnic  unity  to  a  de- 
gree never  since  equalled  in  parallel  circumstances,  and  its 
plan  was  to  tolerate  all  religions — as,  indeed,  do  all  enlight- 
ened states  to-day — but  to  insist  on  the  adoption  of  the 
Roman  law,  and,  in  official  intercourse,  the  Latin  language. 
I  have  not  forgotten  the  converse  example  of  the  Jews, 
which  some  attribute  to  their  religion ;  but  the  Romany, 
who  have  no  religion  worth  mentioning,  have  been  just  as 
tenacious  of  their  traits  under  similar  adverse  circumstances. 

The  Arts,  those  of  Utility,  such  as  pottery,  building, 
agriculture  and  the  domestication  of  animals,  and  those  of 
Pleasure,  such  as  music,  painting  and  sculpture,  must  come 
in  for  a  full  share  of  the  ethnologist's  attention.  They 
represent,  however,  stadia  of  culture  rather  than  national 
character.  They  influence  the  latter  materially  and  are 
influenced  by  it,  and  different  peoples  have  toward  them 
widely  different  endowments  ;  but  their  action  is  generally 
indirect  and  unequally  distributed  throughout  the  social 
unit. 

These  four  fields,  Language,  Government,  Religion 
and  the  Arts,  are  those  which  the  ethnologist  explores 
when  he  would  render  himself  acquainted  with  a  nation's 
character ;  and  now  a  few  words  about  the  methods  of 
study  he  adopts,  and  the  aims,  near  or  remote,  which  he 
keeps  in  view. 

He  first  gathers  his  facts,  from  the  best  sources  at  his 
command,  with  the  closest  sifting  he  can  give  them,  so  as 
to  exclude  errors  of  observation  or  intentional  bias.     From 


12 

the  facts  he  aims  to  discover  on  the  above  Hnes  what  are  or 
were  the  regular  characteristics  of  the  people  or  peoples  he 
is  studying.  The  ethnic  differences  so  revealed  are  to  him 
what  organic  variations  are  to  the  biologist  and  morpholo- 
gist ;  they  indicate  evolution  or  retrogression,  and  show  an 
advance  toward  higher  forms  and  wider  powers,  or  toward 
increasing  feebleness  and  decay. 

To  understand  them  they  must  be  studied  in  connection 
and  causation.  Hence,  the  method  of  the  ethnologist  be- 
comes that  which  in  the  natural  sciences  is  called  the  "  de- 
velopmental "  method.  It  may  be  defined  as  the  historic 
method  where  history  is  lacking.  The  biologist  explains 
the  present  structure  of  an  organ  by  tracing  it  back  to 
simpler  forms  in  lower  animals  until  he  reaches  the  germ 
from  which  it  began.  The  ethnologist  pursues  the  same 
course.  He  selects,  let  us  say,  a  peculiar  institution,  such 
as  caste,  and  when  he  loses  the  traces  of  its  origin  through 
failure  of  written  records,  he  seeks  for  them  in  the  survivals 
of  unwritten  folk-lore,  or  in  similar  forms  in  primitive  con- 
ditions of  culture. 

Here  is  where  Arch£eology  renders  him  most  efficient 
aid.  By  means  of  it  he  has  been  able  to  follow  the  trail 
of  most  of  the  arts  and  institutions  of  life  back  to  a  period 
when  they  were  so  simple  and  uncomplicated  that  they  are 
quite  transparent  and  intelligible.  Later  changes  are  to 
be  analyzed  and  explained  by  the  same  procedure.* 

This  is  the  whole  of  the  ethnologic  method.  It  is  open 
and  easy  when  the  facts  are  in  our  possession.  There  are 
no  secret  springs,  no  occult  forces,  in  the  historic  develop- 
ment of  culture.  Whatever  seems  hidden  or  mysterious, 
is  so  only  because  our  knowledge  of  the  facts  is  imperfect. 
No  magic  and  no  miracle  has  aided  man  in  his  long  con- 

1  Mow  different  from  the  position  of  Voltaire,  wiio,  expressing,  the 
general  sentiment  of  his  times,  wrote, — "The  history  of  barbarous  na- 
tions has  no  more  interest  than  that  of  bears  and  wolves!" 


13 

flict  with  the  material  forces  around  him.  No  ghost  has 
come  from  the  grave,  no  God  from  on  high,  to  help 
him  in  the  bitter  struggle.  What  he  has  won  is  his  own 
by  the  right  of  conquest,  and  he  can  apply  to  himself  the 
words  of  the  poet : 

"  Hast  du  nicht  alles  selbst  vollendet, 
Ileilig  gliihend  Herz?"     {Goct/ic). 

Freed  from  fear  we  can  now  breathe  easily,  for  we  know 
that  no  Dcus  ex  machina  meddles  with  those  serene  and 
mighty  forces  whose  adamantine  grasp  encloses  all  the 
phenomena  of  nature  and  of  life. 

The  ethnologist,  however,  has  not  completed  his  task 
when  he  has  defined  an  cthnos,  and  explained  its  traits  by 
following  them  to  their  sources.  He  has  merely  prepared 
himself  for  a  more  delicate  and  difficult  part  of  his  under- 
taking. 

It  has  been  well  said  by  one  of  the  ablest  ethnologists  of 
this  generation,  the  late  Dr.  Post,  of  Bremen,  that  "The 
facts  of  ethnology  must  ever  be  regarded  as  the  expres- 
sions of  the  general  consciousness  of  Humanity."^  The 
time  has  passed  when  real  thinkers  can  be  satisfied  with 
the  doctrines  of  the  positive  philosophers,  who  insisted 
that  events  and  institutions  must  be  explained  solely  from 
the  phenomenal  or  objective  world,  that  is,  by  other 
events. 

Sounder  views  prevail,  both  in  ethnology  and  its  history. 
"  The  history  of  man,"  says  a  German  writer,  "  is  neither 
a  divine  revelation,  nor  a  process  of  nature  ;  it  is  first  and 
above  all,  the  work  of  man  ;"^  an  opinion  reiterated  by  Prof. 
Flint    in   his  work  on   the  philosophy  of  history   in  these 

1  Gru7idrissder  eflniologischen  Jiirisfrudenz,  Bd.  I.,  s.  5.  (Leipzig,  1S94.) 

2  "Das  Geschichte  ist  weder  eine  Oft'enbarung  Gottes,  noch  ein  Natur- 
process,  sonderneben  Menschenwerk."  Tobler  in  \.h.&  Zcitschrift  fur  V'ol- 
kerpsychologie,  Bd.  XII.,  s.  201. 


H 

words  :  "  History  is  essentially  the  record  of  the  work  and 
manifestation  of  human  nature.''''^  In  both  sciences  it  is 
the  essentially  human  which  alone  occupies  us ;  it  is  the 
life  of  man. 

Now  men  do  not  live  in  material  things,  but  in  mental 
states ;  and  solely  as  they  affect  these  are  the  material 
things  valuable  or  valueless.  Religions,  arts,  laws,  his- 
toric events,  all  have  but  one  standard  of  appraisement,  to 
wit,  the  degree  to  which  they  produce  permanently  benefi- 
cial mental  states  in  the  individuals  influenced  by  them. 
All  must  agree  to  this,  though  they  may  differ  widely  as 
to  what  such  a  mental  state  may  be  ;  whether  one  of  plea- 
surable activity,  or  that  of  the  Buddhist  hermit  who  sinks 
into  a  trance  by  staring  at  his  navel,  or  that  of  the  Trappist 
monk  whose  occupations  are  the  meditation  of  death  and  dig- 
ging his  own  grave. 

The  ethnologist  must  make  up  his  own  mind  about  this, 
and  with  utmost  care,  for  if  his  standard  of  merit  and  de- 
merit is  erroneous,  his  results,  however  much  he  labors  on 
them,  will  have  no  permanent  value.  There  are  means, 
if  he  chooses  to  use  them,  which  will  aid  him  here. 

He  must  endeavor  to  picture  vividly  to  himself  the  men- 
tal condition  which  gave  rise  to  special  arts  and  institu- 
tions, or  which  these  evolved  in  the  people.  He  must  as- 
certain whether  they  increased  or  diminished  the  joy  of 
living,  or  stimulated  the  thirst  for  knowledge  and  the  love  of 
the  true  and  the  beautiful.  He  must  cultivate  the  liveliness 
of  imagination  which  will  enable  him  to  transport  himself 
into  the  epoch  and  surroundings  he  is  studying,  and  feel 
on  himself,  as  it  were,  their  peculiar  influences.  More 
than  all,  chief  of  all,  he  must  have  a  broad,  many-sided, 
tender  sympathy  with  all  things  human,  enabling  him  to 
appreciate  the  emotions  and  arguments  of  all  parties  and 
all  peoples. 

'^History  of  the  Philosophy  of  IIisio>y,  p.  579. 


15 

Such  complete  comprehension  and  spiritual  accord 
will  not  weaken,  but  will  strengthen  his  clear  perception 
of  those  standards  by  which  all  actions  and  institutions 
must  ultimately  be  weighed  and  measured.  There  are 
such  standards,  and  the  really  learned  ethnologist  will  be 
the  last  to  deny  or  overlook  them. 

The  saying  of  Goethe  that  "The  most  unnatural  action 
is  yet  natural,"  is  a  noble  suggestion  of  tolerance ;  but 
human  judgment  can  scarcely  go  to  the  length  of  Madame 
de  Stael's  opinion,  when  she  claims  that  "To  understand 
all  actions  is  to  pardon  all."  We  must  brush  away  the 
sophisms  which  insist  that  all  standards  are  merely  rela- 
tive, and  that  time  and  place  alone  decide  on  right  and 
wrong.  Were  that  so,  not  only  all  morality,  but  all  sci- 
ence and  all  knowledge  were  fluctuating  as  sand.  But  it 
is  not  so.  The  principles  of  Reason,  Truth,  Justice  and 
Love  have  been,  are,  and  ever  will  be  the  same.  Time 
and  place,  race  and  culture,  make  no  difference.  When- 
ever a  country  is  engaged  in  the  diffusion  of  these  immor- 
tal verities,  whenever  institutions  are  calculated  to  foster 
and  extend  them,  that  country,  those  institutions,  take  noble 
precedence  over  all  others  whose  efforts  are  directed  to 
lower  aims.  ^ 

Something  else  remains.  When  the  ethnologist  has  ac- 
quired a  competent  knowledge  of  his  facts,  and  deduced 
from  them  a  clear  conception  of  the  mental  states  of  the 
peoples  he  is  studying,  he  has  not  finished  his  labors.  In- 
stitutions and  arts  in  some  degree  reflect  the  mental  condi- 
tions of  a  people,  in  some  degree  bring  them   about ;  but 

^  There  is  nothing  in  this  inconsistent  with  the  principle  laid  down  by 
Lecky :  "The  men  of  each  age  must  be  judged  bj  the  ideal  of  their  own 
age  and  country,  and  not  by  the  ideal  of  ourselves." — The  Political  Value 
of  History^  p.  50,  New  York,  1892.  The  distinction  is  that  between  the 
relative  standard,  which  we  apply  to  motives  and  persons,  and  the  absolute 
standard,  which  we  apply  to  actions.  The  effects  of  the  latter,  for  good 
or  evil,  are  fixed,  and  independent  of  the  motives  which  prompt  them. 


i6 

the  underlying  source  of  both  is  something  still  more  im- 
material and  intangible,  yet  more  potent,  to  wit,  Ideas 
and  Ideals.  These  are  the  primary  impulses  of  conscious 
human  endeavor,  and  it  is  vain  to  attempt  to  understand 
ethnology  or  to  write  history  without  assigning  their  con- 
sideration the  first  place  in  the  narration. 

I  am  anxious  to  avoid  here  any  metaphysical  obscurity. 

J  My  assertion  is,  that  the  chief    impulses  of    nations  and 

I  peoples  are  abstract  ideas  and  ideals,  unreal  and  unrealiz- 

fable;  and  that  it  is  in  pursuit  of  these  that  the  great  as 

well  as  the  small  movements  on  the  arena  of  national  life 

and  on  the  stage  of  history  have  taken  place. 

You  are  doubtless  aware  that  this  is  no  new  discovery  of 
mine.  Early  in  this  century  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt 
wrote  :  "The  last  and  highest  duty  of  the  historian  is  to 
portray  the  effort  of  the  Idea  to  attain  realization  in  fact ;" 
and  the  most  recent  lecture  on  the  philosophy  of  history 
which  I  have  read,  that  by  Lord  Acton,  contains  this 
maxim  :  "  Ideas  which  in  religion  and  politics  are  truths, 
in  history  are  living  forces." 

I  do  claim  that  it  is  timely  for  me  to  repeat  these  doctrines 
and  to  urge  them  with  vehemence,  for  they  are  generally 
repudiated  by  the  prevailing  schools  of  ethnology  and  his- 
tory in  favor  of  the  opinion  that  objective,  mechanical  in- 
fluences alone  suffice  to  explain  all  the  phenomena  of 
human  life.  This  I  pronounce  an  inadequate  and  an  un- 
scientific opinion. 

There  is  in  living  matter  everywhere  something  which 
escapes  the  most  exhaustive  investigation,  some  subtle 
center  of  impulse,  which  lies  beyond  the  domain  of  corre- 
lated energy,  and  which  acts  directively,  without  increas- 
ing or  diminishing  the  total  of  that  energ3^  Also  in  the 
transformations  of  organic  forms,  there  are  preparations 
and  propulsions  which  no  known  doctrine  of  the  mechan- 
ical, natural  causes  can  interpret.     We  must  accept  the 


17 

presence  of  the  same  powers,  and  in  a  greater  degree,  in 
the  life  and  the  history  of  man.^ 

It  may  be  objected  that  abstract  ideas  are  far  beyond  the 
grasp  of  the  uncultivated  intellect.  The  reply  is,  con- 
sciously to  regard  them  as  abstract,  may  be  ;  but  they  ex- 
ist and  act  for  all  that.  All  sane  people  think  and  talk  ac- 
cording to  certain  abstract  laws  of  grammar  and  logic ; 
and  they  act  in  similar  unconsciousness  of  the  abstractions 
which  impel  them.  Moreover,  the  Idea  is  usually  clothed 
in  a  concrete  Ideal,  a  personification,  which  brings  it  home 
to  the  simplest  mind.  This  was  long  ago  pointed  out  by 
the  observant  Machiavelli  in  his  statement  that  every  re- 
form of  a  government  or  religion  is  in  the  popular  mind 
personified  as  the  effort  of  one  individual. 

In  every  nation  or  ethnos  there  is  a  prevailing  opinion  as 
to  what  the  highest  tvpical  human  being  should  be.  This 
"  Ideal  of  Humanity,"  as  it  has  been  called,  is  more  or  less 
constantly  and  consciously  pursued,  and  becomes  a  spur  to 
national  action  and  to  a  considerable  degree  an  arbiter  of 
national  destiny.  If  the  ideal  is  low  and  bestial,  the  course 
of  that  nation  is  downward,  self-destroying ;  if  it  is  lofty 
and  pure,  the  energies  of  the  people  are  directed  toward 
the  maintenance  of  those  principles  which  are  elevating 
and  preservative.  These  are  not  mechanical  forces,  in  any 
rational  sense  of  the  term ;  but  they  are  forces  the  potent 
directive  and  formative  influence  of  which  cannot  be  denied 
and  must  not  be  underestimated. 

Just  in  proportion  as  such  ideas  are  numerous,  clear  and 
true  in  the  national  mind,  do  their  power  augment  and 
their  domain  extend  ;  just  so  much  more  quickly  and  firmly 
do  they  express  themselves,  in  acts,  forms  and  institutions, 
and  thus  enable  the  nation  to  enrich,  beautify  and 
strengthen    its   own    existence.     We   have  but  to   glance 

J  "The  historian,"  says  Tolstoi,  "  is  obliged  to  admit  an  inexplicable 
force,  -which  acts  upon  his  elementary  forces."  Po-aier  and  Liberty^  p> 
28  (Eng.  Trans.,  New  York,  18S8). 


along  the  nations  of  the  world  and  to  reflect  on  the  outlines 
of  their  histories,  to  perceive  the  correctness  of  the  conclu- 
sion which  Prof.  Lazarus,  perhaps  the  most  eminent  ana- 
lyst of  ethnic  character  of  this  generation,  reaches  in  one 
of  his  essays:  "  A  people  which  is  not  rich  in  ideas,  is 
never  rich ;  one  that  is  not  strong  in  its  thinking  powers, 
is  never  strong."^ 

I  claim,  therefore,  that  the  facts  of  ethnology  and  the 
study  of  racial  psychology  justify  me  in  formulating  this 
maxim  for  the  guidance  of  the  historian  :  The  conscious 
and  deliberate  -piirstiit  of  ideal  aims  is  the  highest  causality 
in  human  history. 

The  historian  who  would  fulfil  his  mission  in  its  amplest 
sense  must  trace  his  facts  back  to  the  ideas  which  gave 
them  birth  ;  he  must  recognize  and  define  these  as  the 
properties  of  specific  peoples  ;  and  he  must  estimate  their 
worth  by  their  tendency  to  national  preservation  or  national 
destruction. 

This  is  the  maxim,  the  axiom,  if  you  please,  which  both 
the  ethnologist  and  the  historian  must  bear  ever  present  in 
mind  if  they  would  comprehend  the  meaning  of  institu- 
tions or  the  significance  of  events.  They  must  be  referred 
to,  and  explained  by,  the  ideas  which  gave  them  birth. 
As  an  American  historian  has  tersely  put  it,  "The  facts 
relating  to  successive  phases  of  human  thought  constitute 
History."  2 

I  am  aware  that  a  strong  school  of  modern  philosophers 
will  present  the  objection  that  thought  itself  is  but  a  neces- 
sary result  of  chemical  and  mechanical  laws,  and  therefore 
that  it  cannot  be  an  independent  cause.  Dr.  Post  has 
pointedly  expressed  this  position  in  the  words:   "We  do 

'  See  his  article  "  Ueber  die  Ideen  in  der  Geschichte,"  in  the  Zcitsclirift 
fur  Volker psychologic.  Bd.  III.,  S.  486. 

^Brooks  Adams,  The  Law  of  Civilization  and  Decay,  Preface  (Lon- 
don, 1895).  This  author  lias  reached  an  advanced  position  -with  reference 
to  thought  and  emotion  as  the  impulses  of  humanity. 


19 

not  think ;  thinking  goes  on  within  us,"  ^  just  as  other 
functions,  such  as  circulation  and  secretion,  go  on. 

It  is  not  possible  for  me  at  this  time  to  enter  into  this 
branch  of  the  discussion.  But  I  may  ask  your  attention 
to  the  fact  that  one  of  the  highest  authorities  on  the  laws 
of  natural  science,  the  late  George  J.  Romanes,  reached 
by  the  severest  induction  an  exactly  opposite  opinion,  which 
he  announced  in  these  words  :  "The  human  mind  is  itself 
a  causal  agent.  Its  motives  are  in  large  part  matters  of 
its  own  creation.  *  *  *  Intelligent  volition  is  a  true 
cause  of  adjustive  movement."' 

For  myself,  after  what  I  have  endeavored  to  make  an 
unbiased  study  of  both  opinions,  I  subscribe  unhesitatingly 
to  the  latter,  and  look  upon  Mind  not  only  as  a  potent  but 
as  an  independent  cause  of  motion  in  the  natural  world,  of 
action  in  the  individual  life,  and,  therefore,  of  events  in  the 
history  of  the  species. 

Confining  ourselves  to  ethnology  and  history,  the  causa- 
tive idea,  as  I  have  said,  makes  itself  felt  through  ethnic 
ideals.  These  are  influential  in  proportion  as  they  are 
vividl}'  realized  by  the  national  genius  ;  and  elevating  in  pro- 
portion as  they  partake  of  those  final  truths  already  referred 
to,  which  are  all  merely  forms  of  expression  of  right  rea- 
soning. These  ideals  are  the  idola/ori,  which  have  some- 
times deluded,  sometimes  glorified,  those  who  believed  in 
them. 

I  shall  mention  a  few  of  them  to  make  my  meaning  more 
apparent. 

That  with  which  we  are  most  familiar  in  history  is  the 
warrior  ideal,  the  personification  of  military  glory  and 
martial  success.     It  is  present  among  the  rudest  tribes,  and 

1  Gru>idiiss  der  ethnologischen  Jurisfrudenz,  Band  I.,  s.  4. 

"^  Mind  and  Motion^  pp.  29,  140,  etc.  (London,  1895.)  Prof.  Paulsen 
goes  much  further,  as,  "The  inner  disposition  spontaneously  determines 
the  development  of  the  individual,"  and  "The  organism  is,  as  it  were, 
congealed  voluntary-  action." — hitrodnctton  to  Philosophy,  pp,  1S7,  190. 


20 

that  it  is  active  to-day,  events  in  recent  European  history 
prove  only  too  clearly ;  and  among  ourselves,  little  would 
be  needed  to  awaken  it  to  vivid  life. 

We  are  less  acquainted  with  religious  ideals,  as  they  have 
weakened  under  the  conditions  of  higher  culture.  They 
belong  in  European  history  more  to  the  medieval  than  to 
the  modern  period.  Among  Mohammedans  and  Brahmins 
we  can  still  see  them  in  their  full  vigor.  In  these  lower 
faiths  we  can  still  find  that  intense  fanaticism  which  can 
best  be  described  by  the  expression  of  Novalis,  "intoxi- 
cated with  God,"  drunk  with  the  divine  ;^  and  this  it  is 
which  preserves  to  these  nations  what  power  they  still  re- 
tain. 

Would  that  I  could  claim  for  our  own  people  a  grander 
conception  of  the  purpose  of  life  than  either  of  these.  But 
alas  !  their  ideal  is  too  evident  to  be  mistaken.  I  call  it 
the  "  divitial  "  ideal,  that  of  the  rich  man,  that  which  makes 
the  acquisition  of  material  wealth  the  one  standard  of  suc- 
cess in  life,  the  only  justifiable  aim  of  effort.  To  most 
American  citizens  the  assertion  that  there  is  any  more  im- 
portant, more  sensible  purpose  than  this,  is  simply  incom- 
prehensible or  incredible. 

In  place  of  any  of  these,  the  man  who  loves  his  kind 
would  substitute  others  ;  and  as  these  touch  closel}'  on  the 
business  of  the  ethnologist  and  the  historian  when  either 
would  apply  the  knowledge  he  has  gained  to  the  present 
condition  of  society,  I  will  briefly  refer  to  some  advanced 
by  various  writers. 

The  first  and  most  favorite  is  that  of  moral  perfection. 
It  has  been  formulated  in  the  expression  :  "In  the  prog- 
ress of  ethical  conceptions  lies  the  progress  of  history  it- 
self." (Schafer.)  To  such  writers  the  ideal  of  duty  per- 
formed transcends  all  others,  and  is  complete  in  itself.    The 

'Before  him,  however,  the  expression  "  ebriiis  Deo"  was  applied  to  the 
ancient  rhapsodists. 


21 

chief  end  of  man,  they  say,  is  to  lead  the  moral  life,  dili- 
gently to  cultivate  the  ethical  perception,  the  notion  of 
"  the  ought,"  and  to  seek  in  this  the  finality  of  his  existence.^ 

Keener  thinkers  have,  however,  recognized  that  virtue, 
morality,  the  ethical  evolution,  cannot  be  an  end  in  itself, 
but  must  be  a  means  to  some  other  end.  Effort  directed 
toward  other,  altruism  in  any  form,  must  have  its  final 
measurement  of  value  in  terms  of  self ;  otherwise  the  im- 
mutable principles  of  justice  are  attacked.  I  cannot  en- 
large upon  this  point,  and  will  content  myself  with  a  refer- 
ence to  Prof.  Steinthal's  admirable  essay  on  "The  Idea  of 
ethical  Perfection,"  published  some  years  ago.^  He  shows 
that  in  its  last  analysis  the  Good  has  its  value  solely  in  the 
freedom  which  it  confers.  Were  all  men  truly  ethical,  all 
would  be  perfectly  free.  Therefore  Freedom,  in  its  highest 
sense,  according  to  him  and  several  other  accomplished 
reasoners,  is  the  aim  of  morality,  and  is  that  which  gives  it 
worth. 

This  argument  seems  to  me  a  step  ahead,  but  yet 
to  remain  incomplete.  For  after  all,  what  is  freedom?  It 
means  only  opportunity,  not  action ;  and  opportunity  alone 
is  a  negative  quantity,  a  zero.  Opportunity  for  what,  I 
ask? 

For  an  answer,  I  turn  with  satisfaction  to  an  older  writer 
on  the  philosophy  of  history,  one  whose  genial  sympathy 
with  the  human  heart  glows  on  every  page  of  his  volumes, 
to  Johann  Gottfried  von  Herder.^  The  one  final  aim,  he 
tells  us,  of  all  institutions,  laws,  governments  and  religions, 

'As  expressed  by  Prof.  Drojsen,  in  his  work,  Principles  of  History, 
(p.  i6,  New  York,  1893),  recently  translated  by  President  Andrews,  of 
Brown  University — "Historical  things  are  the  perpetual  actualization  of 
the  moral  forces."  Elsewhere  he  says — "History  is  humanity  becoming 
conscious  concerning  itself,"  There  is  no  objection  to  such  expressions ; 
they  are  good  as  far  as  they  go ;  but  they  do  not  go  to  the  end. 

''In  the  Zeitschrift fUr  Volkerpsychologie,  Band  XI.,  Heft  II. 

'  Idcen  ziir  Geschichte  dcr  Mensc/iJieit,  B.  XV.,  Cap.  I. 


22 

of  all  efforts  and  events,  is  that  each  person,  undisturbed 
by  others,  may  employ  his  own  powers  to  their  fullest  ex- 
tent, and  thus  gain  for  himself  a  completer  existence,  a 
more  beautiful  enjoyment  of  his  faculties. 

Thus,  to  the  enriching  of  the  individual  life,  its  worth, 
its  happiness  and  its  fullness,  does  all  endeavor  of  human- 
ity tend  ;  in  it,  lies  the  end  of  all  exertion,  the  rev/ard  of  all 
toil ;  to  define  it,  should  be  the  object  of  ethnology  ;  and  to 
teach  it,  the  purpose  of  history. 

Let  me  recapitulate. 

The  ethnologist  regards  each  social  group  as  an  entity  or 
individual,  and  endeavors  to  place  clearly  before  his  mind 
its  similarities  and  differences  with  other  groups.  Taking 
objective  facts  as  his  guides,  such  as  laws,  arts,  institutions 
and  language,  he  seeks  from  these  to  understand  the  men- 
tal life,  the  psychical  welfare  of  the  people,  and  beyond 
this  to  reach  the  ideals  which  they  cherished  and  the  ideas 
which  were  the  impulses  of  their  activities.  Events  and 
incidents,  such  as  are  recorded  in  national  annals,  have  for 
him  their  main,  if  not  only  value,  as  indications  of  the 
inner  or  soul  life  of  the  people. 

By  the  comparison  of  several  social  groups  he  reaches 
wider  generalizations  ;  and  finally  to  those  which  charac- 
terize the  common  consciousness  of  Humanity,  the  psy- 
chical universals  of  the  species.  By  such  comparison  he 
also  ascertains  under  what  conditions  and  in  what  direc- 
tions men  have  progressed  most  rapidly  toward  the  culti- 
vation and  the  enjoyment  of  the  noblest  elements  of  their 
nature ;  and  this  strictly  inductive  knowledge  is  that  alone 
which  he  would  apply  to  furthering  the  present  needs  and 
aspirations  of  social  life. 

This  is  the  method  which  he  would  suggest  for  history 
in  the  broad  meaning  of  the  term.  It  should  be  neither  a 
mere  record  of  events,  nor  the  demonstration  of  a  thesis, 
but  a  study,  through  occurrences  and  institutions,  of  the 


23 

mental  states  of  peoples  at  different  epochs,  explanatory 
of  their  success  or  failure,  and  practically  applicable  to 
the  present  needs  of  human  society. 

Such  explanation  should  be  strictly  limited  in  two  direc- 
tions. First,  by  the  principle  that  man  can  be  explained 
only  by  man,  and  can  be  so  explained  completely.  That 
is,  no  super-human  agencies  need  be  invoked  to  interpret 
any  of  the  incidents  of  history :  and,  on  the  other  hand,  no 
merely  material  or  mechanical  conditions,  such  as  climate, 
food  and  environment,  are  sufficient  for  a  full  interpreta- 
tion. Beyond  these  lie  the  inexhaustible  sources  of  im- 
pulse in  the  essence  of  Mind  itself. 

Secondly,  the  past  can  teach  us  nothing  of  the  future 
beyond  a  vague  surmise.  All  theories  which  proceed  on 
an  assumption  of  knowledge  concerning  finalities,  whether 
in  science  or  dogma,  are  cobwebs  of  the  brain,  not  the 
fruit  of  knowledge,  and  obscure  the  faculty  of  intellectual 
perception.  It  is  wasteful  of  one's  time  to  frame  them,  and 
fatal  to  one's  w'ork  to  adopt  them. 

These  are  also  two  personal  traits  which,  it  seems  to  me, 
are  requisite  to  the  comprehension  of  ethnic  psychology, 
and  therefore  are  desirable  to  both  the  ethnologist  and  the 
historian.     The  one  of  these  is  the  poetic  instinct. 

I  fear  this  does  not  sound  well  from  the  scientific  rostrum, 
for  the  prevailing  notion  among  scientists  is  that  the  poet 
is  a  fabulist,  and  is  therefore  as  far  off  as  possible  from  the 
platform  they  occupy.  No  one,  how^ever,  can  really  un- 
derstand a  people  who  remains  outside  the  pale  of  the  world  of 
imagination  in  which  it  finds  its  deepest  joys  ;  and  nowhere 
is  this  depicted  so  clearly  as  in  its  songs  and  by  its  bards. 
The  ethnologist  who  has  no  taste  for  poetry  may  gather 
much  that  is  good,  but  will  miss  the  best ;  the  historian  who 
neglects  the  poetic  literature  of  a  nation  turns  away  his 
eyes  from  the  vista  w^hich  would  give  him  the  farthest 
insight  into  national  character. 


24 

The  other  trait  is  more  difficult  to  define.  To  apprehend 
what  is  noblest  in  a  nation  one  must  oneself  be  noble. 
Knowledge  of  facts  and  an  unbiased  judgment  need  to  be 
accompanied  by  a  certain  development  of  personal  char- 
acter which  enables  one  to  be  in  sympathy  with  the  finest 
tissue  of  human  nature,  from  the  fibre  of  which  are  formed 
heroes  and  martyrs,  patriots  and  saints,  enthusiasts  and 
devotees.  To  appreciate  these  something  of  the  same 
stuff  must  be  in  the  mental  constitution  of  the  observer. 

Such  is  the  ethnologist's  view  of  history.  He  does  not 
pretend  to  be  either  a  priest  or  a  prophet.  He  claims 
neither  to  possess  the  final  truth  nor  to  foresee  it.  He  is, 
therefore  equally  unwelcome  to  the  dogmatist,  the  optim- 
istic naturalist  and  the  speculative  philosopher.  He  refuses 
any  explanations  which  either  contradict  or  transcend 
human  reason ;  but  he  insists  that  human  reason  is  one  of 
the  causal  facts  which  he  has  to  consider ;  and  this  brings 
him  into  conflict  with  both  the  mystic  and  the  materialist. 

Though  he  exalts  the  power  of  ideas,  he  is  no  idealist, 
but  practical  to  the  last  degree ;  for  he  denies  the  worth  of 
any  art,  science,  event  or  institution  which  does  not  directly 
or  indirectly  contribute  to  the  elevation  of  the  individual 
man  or  woman,  the  common  average  person,  the  human 
being. 

To  this  one  end,  understanding  it  as  we  best  can,  he 
claims  all  effort  should  tend  ;  and  any  other  view  than  this 
of  the  philosophy  of  history,  any  other  standard  of  value 
applied  to  the  records  of  the  past,  he  looks  upon  as  delu- 
sive and  deceptive,  no  matter  under  what  heraldry  of  title 
or  seal  of  sanctity  it  is  offered. 


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